

## **Institutional Durability of Delivery Units in Indonesia: Preliminary Findings**

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### **Abstract**

**Abstract**, This study examines the dynamics and institutional durability of various delivery units in Indonesia, including the Presidential Work Unit and the Presidential Staff Office, within a comparative cross-administrative framework and the conceptual lens of deliverology, as practiced by the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit in the United Kingdom. In contrast to short-term approaches driven by leadership style and performance orientation, this study emphasizes the importance of systematizing and sustaining coordination, synchronization, and control functions. The findings reveal that establishing delivery units in Indonesia tends to be temporary and pragmatic, lacking robust legal foundations and strong institutional integration. Political factors, leadership personalization, and overlapping authorities emerge as key impediments. Employing a collective or multiple-case study design with a comparative analytical approach, this research concludes that while several principles of deliverology, such as using targets and performance monitoring, have been adopted, delivery units have yet to be institutionalized as long-term governance instruments. Therefore, the study recommends establishing a stronger legal framework, developing adaptable institutional designs, and promoting professional leadership to ensure the continuity of these units in supporting the implementation of national priority policies.

**Abstrak**, Penelitian ini menganalisis dinamika dan ketahanan kelembagaan dalam berbagai delivery unit di Indonesia, seperti Unit Kerja Presiden, Kantor Staf Presiden, dan lainnya dalam konteks perbandingan lintas pemerintahan dengan kerangka deliverology atau praktik kerja Prime Minister Delivery Unit di Inggris. Berbeda dengan pendekatan jangka pendek berbasis gaya kepemimpinan dan kinerja, kajian ini menekankan pentingnya pelembagaan fungsi koordinasi, sinkronisasi dan pengendalian secara sistemik dan berkelanjutan. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa pembentukan delivery unit di Indonesia bersifat temporer, pragmatis, dan belum didukung oleh dasar hukum dan integrasi kelembagaan yang kuat. Faktor politik, personalisasi kepemimpinan, dan tumpang tindih kewenangan menjadi hambatan utama. Menggunakan studi kasus collective atau multiple dengan menganalisis secara komparatif, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa meskipun beberapa prinsip deliverology telah diadopsi seperti penggunaan target dan pemantauan kinerja, delivery unit belum mampu melembaga sebagai instrumen tata kelola jangka panjang. Oleh karena itu, diperlukan dasar hukum yang lebih kuat, desain kelembagaan yang adaptif, serta kepemimpinan profesional untuk memastikan keberlanjutan fungsi unit ini dalam pengawalan kebijakan prioritas nasional.

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## Introduction

This paper aims to initiate a deeper discussion on delivery units and their institutional durability in Indonesia, spanning the period from the establishment of the first explicitly formulated delivery unit during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration, its continuation under President Joko Widodo, and its current context during President Prabowo Subianto's administration. The focus on delivery units across different administrations distinguishes this study from normative works that remain confined to a technocratic perspective (Barber, Kihn, et al., 2011; Barber, Moffit, et al., 2011) and do not yet explore in depth the political and governance dimensions related to presidential leadership and institutional design. These factors can significantly influence the continuity of delivery units.

The importance of examining the institutional durability of delivery units in Indonesia is supported by both empirical and theoretical considerations. Empirically, delivery units in Indonesia frequently change their institutional names, along with shifts in their formal positions and authority. Institutional mandates are also distributed across multiple entities, not only within a single delivery unit but also within institutions that are not formally categorized as delivery units. In the present context, several institutions even perform the functions of delivery units, excluding those operating at subnational levels. Only two government leaders in Indonesia have explicitly announced the establishment of delivery units, namely President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Governor of Jakarta, Anies Baswedan (Hutagalung & Mayasari, 2023).

From a theoretical perspective, the existence of delivery units, as well as other institutions responsible for overseeing programs, development agendas, or government control, offers the potential to enhance the state-of-the-art or enrich the advancement of delivery unit studies, particularly in terms of institutional durability. Institutional durability in this context refers not only to the duration of an institution's existence but also to its ability to persist across different administrations in a systematic and sustainable manner. This leads to a fundamental question: why, in the Indonesian context, have delivery units or other institutions responsible for program, development, or government control been unable to achieve such institutional durability?

### ***Overview of Institutions Responsible for the Oversight of Programs, Development, or Government Control in Indonesia***

At the beginning of his administration, President Prabowo Subianto formed the Red and White Cabinet, which comprises seven Coordinating Ministries, 41 Ministries, several government agencies, and various appointed roles, including Special Advisors, Special Envoys, and Presidential Special Staff. This cabinet structure was guided by narratives emphasizing a professional cabinet, efficient governance, national greatness, continuity of development, and the fulfillment of Asta Cita (Nugroho et al., 2025). In terms of overseeing development and program implementation under the Asta Cita framework, several ministries and agencies within the presidential domain underwent functional reconfigurations. For example, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (PAN-RB) were placed directly under the President's authority, similar to the Ministry of State Secretariat and the Ministry of National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas). The Cabinet Secretariat was restructured to become the Cabinet Support Secretariat under the Ministry of State Secretariat. Additionally, the creation of the Development Control and Special Investigation Agency (Bappisu) and the Presidential Communication Office (PCO) resulted in the assumption of several functions that were previously carried out by the Presidential Staff Office (KSP).

Analyzing regulations governing program control institutions in Indonesia shows a pattern of changing nomenclature across different presidential administrations. During President Soeharto's tenure, the Ministry of State Secretariat oversaw several key components

of governmental operations, including the Cabinet Secretariat and the Secretariat for the Operational Control of Development (Setdalopsbang). At the time, the State Secretary also held the concurrent role of Cabinet Secretary, providing administrative support to the President as both head of the cabinet and head of government. Setdalopsbang was led by a Secretary who assisted the State Secretary in matters related to operational development control. Under President Abdurrahman Wahid, the Cabinet Secretariat and Setdalopsbang were formalized as separate entities, although their budgets remained coordinated by the Ministry of State Secretariat. During this period, the Ministry continued to function as the administrative support body to the President in his role as head of state. The name Setdalopsbang was changed to the Secretariat for Government Control, which was later merged into the Cabinet Secretariat.

During the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Cabinet Secretariat was placed directly under the President's authority and given a separate budget from the Ministry of State Secretariat. A new institution for program and development control was established under the Presidential Working Unit for Program Management and Reform (UKP3R), which was later renamed the Presidential Working Unit for Supervision and Control of Development (UKP4). Under President Joko Widodo, UKP4 was dissolved and replaced by KSP. At that time, KSP took over functions similar to those of Setdalopsbang and earlier program control institutions, with an expanded mandate that included political information and strategic communication. The ongoing transformation in functions, organizational structures, and budgeting of institutions tasked with program, development, or governance control across different presidential periods raises fundamental questions about the drivers behind these changes and their evolution. This calls for a comprehensive study that examines the phenomenon through an analytical framework rooted in governance, public policy, and political analysis.

### ***Previous Studies***

Research on institutions or working units responsible for programs, development, or government control in Indonesia has been conducted at various times. One study on UKP3R, using a critical discourse analysis of media coverage, explored its background, the controversies and opposition it faced, the support it received, the stance taken by the President and the government during the public debate, the relevant regulatory and legislative context, as well as its impacts and the resulting calls for resolution (Vera, 2007). Later studies focused on the broader concept of Presidential Working Units, particularly UKP4, examining its formation through the lens of constitutional and democratic principles. These works raised critical questions about the scope of presidential authority and the potential for overlapping institutional mandates (Purnamawati, 2020; Ridho & Amin, 2021). Similarly, research on KSP, often employing the same analytical approach used for UKP4, emphasized that although its establishment falls within the President's prerogative, its authority, as defined by Presidential Regulation, may conflict with higher-order legislation. This has led to overlapping functions with the Vice President's Office, Coordinating Ministries, the Ministry of State Secretariat, and the Cabinet Secretariat, all of which have ministerial-level status. Such overlaps are further complicated by concerns over political interests, institutional rationalization, and bureaucratic efficiency (Almichael & Irwandi, 2023; Santika, 2016; Suyadi, 2019).

At the ministerial and sub-national levels, several studies have examined the roles of organizational entities or task forces such as GovTech Edu under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology; the Digital Transformation Office under the Ministry of Health; INA Digital under the Ministry of PAN-RB; and the Governor's Team for the Acceleration of Development (TGUPP) under the Jakarta Provincial Government. These entities are often categorized as delivery units. Research on local government task forces, for instance, has highlighted their emergence as a form of administrative discretion aimed at ensuring effective public service delivery or aligning priority programs within the limited

tenure of regional leaders, despite the absence of clear regulatory foundations. This kind of discretion is considered legitimate within the scope of administrative governance, particularly when addressing legal or institutional vacuums. However, scholars have recommended that central and local governments develop formal and permanent regulatory frameworks for delivery units. These units should be positioned as strategic support mechanisms rather than temporary or politically driven instruments. Furthermore, they must be integrated with the bureaucratic system to promote more agile, responsive, and accountable governance (Hutagalung & Mayasari, 2023).

### ***Delivery Unit and Deliverology***

The concept of the delivery unit originates from the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU), established by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2001 and led by Michael Barber. It was created to address persistent shortcomings in policy implementation, particularly in areas such as health, education, transportation, and crime. In his publications on PMDU's performance, Barber introduced the term deliverology, which refers to a systematic approach to executing public reform agendas and delivering on political commitments (Barber, Kihn, et al., 2011). Failures in policy and program implementation are often attributed to shifting political priorities, difficulties in measuring success, unclear consequences for failure, and opaque motivations among stakeholders. Deliverology is built on three core components: (1) the formation of a small, high-performing team focused on delivery; (2) the collection and use of data to set measurable targets and performance trajectories; and (3) the implementation of structured work routines that sustain attention on results. A key distinction of the delivery unit is its role as an extension of executive leadership, differing from traditional project management offices. Characteristics of an effective delivery unit include credible leadership, a small but agile team, non-hierarchical coordination, and members who are both capable and humble. These units often function as "critical friends", trusted advisors who offer candid feedback while maintaining system-wide credibility. To align with institutional structures, particularly in finance or budgeting, delivery units may rely on formal agreements or regulatory frameworks to define priorities.

A central feature of deliverology is focusing on two main instruments: targets and trajectories. Targets should be measurable, time-bound, and ambitious—balancing aspiration and feasibility to maintain accountability without discouraging implementers. Delivery units ensure these targets are visible and understood across the system. Meanwhile, trajectories represent evidence-based projections of progress over time toward those targets. Crafting effective targets and trajectories may involve internal data, historical trends, external benchmarks, and rigorous evaluation of policy design (Barber, Moffit, et al., 2011).

Arguably, the most important contribution of a delivery unit lies in the development of structured routines. These regular, scheduled interactions—such as monthly notes, quarterly reviews, and biannual delivery reports—enable leaders, program owners, and key stakeholders to assess performance and make timely strategic decisions. These routines create deadlines that generate urgency and drive action. Delivery reports, for instance, estimate the likelihood of success for each priority initiative using an assessment framework that considers planning quality, implementation capacity, and progress, often rated on a four-point scale. While not always exact, such assessments are vital managerial tools for ensuring adaptability and responsiveness. Overall, deliverology offers a valuable framework for public leaders committed to achieving tangible outcomes. By reflecting on past implementation challenges and systematically applying the principles of deliverology, leaders can enhance performance management and policy execution in measurable and sustainable ways (Barber, 2015).

## Theory Framework

The adoption of delivery unit or the deliverology approach, pioneered by Michael Barber through the establishment of the PMDU in the United Kingdom, has been examined through various mainstream theoretical lenses (Birch & Jacob, 2019; Brock, 2020; Lafuente & González, 2018; Rao, 2022; World Bank, 2017). From the perspective of central control over policy implementation (Richards & Smith, 2006), the PMDU was conceived in part as a response to the limitations of New Public Management (NPM) reforms. Its formation was also shaped by features of the UK's political system, notably its strong personalism, the absence of a codified constitution, and the centralization of authority characteristic of the Westminster model. The PMDU significantly reshaped the role of the UK central government. It reallocated resources toward the center, redirected bureaucratic focus from processes to outcomes, and introduced new tools of control, including detailed performance metrics and data systems.

Additionally, it rebalanced information asymmetries between the center, departments, and local authorities while institutionalizing central control capacity, even as personalism remained a defining feature of the system. While formal policy coordination remained under the Cabinet Office, the PMDU exercised operational authority over major sectors and government priorities. Within the field of public management and policy, the PMDU model presents several dilemmas. These include tensions between central control and implementer autonomy, the limitations of targets as performance measures, and the risks of undermining local capacities, accountability systems, and administrative cultures through heavy-handed central intervention (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). Further concerns have been raised regarding the appropriateness of the Prime Minister's direct involvement in implementation, particularly given the limited institutional capacity of the Prime Minister's Office compared to line ministries. This issue becomes more pronounced during national crises.

From the perspective of comparative politics (Lindquist, 2006), implementation units such as delivery units often emerge not from theoretical developments but as pragmatic responses by political leaders seeking to ensure the realization of flagship policies. Earlier implementation studies emphasized the gap between policy design and execution. In contrast, the rise of delivery units reflects a shift toward broader governance frameworks, such as whole-of-government coordination, policy networks, and policy instrumentation. However, institutional capacity remains an underexplored dimension. Motivations for creating these units vary and include fulfilling campaign promises, strengthening political oversight over bureaucracies, addressing design and coordination failures, shifting bureaucratic culture, and enhancing legitimacy and administrative professionalism. Functionally, these units constitute part of a government's adhocracy, taking on different roles depending on the context, from upstream policy vetting to downstream monitoring and intervention.

These units often compete with other central institutions for authority, resources, and political attention, resulting in overlapping mandates in areas such as coordination, evaluation, or reform functions. Lessons from comparative cases highlight diverse motivations and outcomes: the UK's PMDU was a personalized instrument of control, while Australia's units served as tools for disciplining cabinet behavior, and New Zealand's units emerged in response to bureaucratic shortcomings. Across these contexts, a common vulnerability is their reliance on political leadership and exposure to institutional change. Nonetheless, delivery units may be institutionalized over time if they prove to be effective and adaptive. This is reflected in the evolution toward the Delivery 2.0 paradigm, which emphasizes performance that is measurable, outcome-oriented, rapidly executed, efficiently managed, and publicly communicated—even amid fiscal constraints—compared to Delivery 1.0, which focuses more narrowly on program implementation (Daly & Singham, 2012).

Despite extensive discussions on the creation, restructuring, budget allocation, and functional overlaps of delivery units in both international and Indonesian contexts (Scharff, 2014), the question of their institutional durability remains underexplored (Clemens & Cook, 1999;

Rocco, 2021). Key questions persist: To what extent can these units outlast a single administration? Are there concrete efforts toward their institutionalization, such as legal formalization, integration into bureaucratic systems, or embedding within national governance frameworks? Or are they inherently pragmatic, short-lived mechanisms driven by political expediency and heavily reliant on presidential leadership? Alternatively, could they evolve into enduring instruments of state capacity and strategic governance?

Based on the elaboration of this sequence of theoretical frameworks, durability will be analyzed through two main lenses. The first lens, central control and personalism (Richards & Smith, 2006), suggests that the durability of these units tends to be low because they function as adhoc political instruments that depend on the personal support of a particular leader. The second lens, derived from comparative politics and institutional capacity (Lindquist, 2006), will be used to examine the extent to which delivery units have transformed from pragmatic mechanisms into permanent instruments of state institutions (Clemens & Cook, 1999). The analysis will also focus on evidence of legal formalization, structural integration, and adaptive capability (Daly & Singham, 2012) in order to assess whether these units merely reflect short term political strategies or have evolved into permanent strategic capacities

## Methods

This study not only analyzes the institutions responsible for program development and government control in Indonesia through the conceptual lens of delivery units and the deliverology approach but also aims to examine their institutional durability. The establishment of UKP3R and UKP4 under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the dynamics of KSP under President Joko Widodo, and the emergence of entities such as PCO and Bappisu under President Prabowo Subianto reveal a recurring pattern of reorganization that is highly contingent upon presidential leadership. These institutions have generally been created through presidential regulations or decrees, rather than higher legal instruments such as statutory laws, making them vulnerable to shifts in political and administrative leadership.

The absence of a permanent regulatory framework also reflects the limited institutionalization of these units within the broader government system. Unlike technocratic bodies or regulatory authorities, delivery units in Indonesia are often positioned as direct extensions of the President, rather than as integrated elements of the formal bureaucratic structure. This positioning significantly constrains their long-term ability to perform coordination, evaluation, and control functions in a sustained and consistent manner. Moreover, there is no clear mechanism for integrating the roles of these units into the permanent inter-agency relationships among ministries and other state institutions. As a result, these units tend to function as short-term, politically driven instruments, rather than as institutionalized platforms capable of navigating policy agendas across successive administrations. One of the central challenges, therefore, lies not only in the effectiveness of program implementation, but also in the institutional resilience of these units—that is, their capacity to sustain national priority agendas over time, across leadership transitions, and through political cycles. This issue also raises broader questions about the institutional design of the Coordinating Ministries and the role of presidential special advisors.

This research employs a comparative-historical and qualitative methodology using an institutional case study approach (Cresswell & Cresswell, 2018). Specifically, it adopts a multiple or collective case study design (Yin, 2008) to analyze and compare the formation, functions, and institutional evolution of several delivery units in Indonesia, including UKP3R, UKP4, KSP, PCO, and Bappisu, across different presidential administrations. The analysis focuses on variables such as political leadership, legal foundation, systemic integration, and the effectiveness of institutional control mechanisms. Data were collected exclusively through an intensive examination of regulatory documents, institutional archives, policy reports, and secondary sources, including academic literature and media coverage. Thematic and

institutional analyses were conducted for each administration since the introduction of direct presidential elections in Indonesia. The analysis therefore centers on archival and documentary evidence to reconstruct the organizational history and institutional logic or the 'case' of each delivery unit.

## Results and Discussion

The following section presents preliminary findings on delivery units or other institutions responsible for overseeing programs, development, or government control in Indonesia. These initial findings do not yet include an examination of leadership dynamics within these institutions, nor do they cover entities such as councils, agencies, and presidential special advisers, particularly in the current context of the early administration of President Prabowo Subianto. These elements are intentionally excluded to maintain a more coherent structure that aligns with the analytical framework of this study.

### *Delivery Units during the Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono*

During the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, two delivery units were established: UKP3R during his first term in collaboration with Vice President Muhammad Jusuf Kalla, and UKP4 during his second term with Vice President Boediono. UKP3R, or UKP-PPR was formed through Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2006, while UKP4, or UKP-PPP was established under Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2009. UKP3R was mandated to assist the President in monitoring, controlling, facilitating, and accelerating the implementation of priority programs and reforms. Its areas of focus included improving the business and investment climate and its supporting systems, advancing administrative reform, enhancing the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), expanding the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and strengthening law enforcement. In contrast, UKP4 was tasked with overseeing and controlling the implementation of national development priorities. Initially, its mandate centered on improving the effectiveness of the national logistics system, accelerating bureaucratic reform and public service delivery, enhancing the investment climate, and increasing the performance and accountability of strategic SOEs. Over time, its scope was expanded through Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2012 to include strengthening the effectiveness of law enforcement and promoting equitable and sustainable economic growth.

Overall, based on document analysis and archival research, the governance structures of UKP3R and UKP4 during President Yudhoyono's administration can be summarized as follows:

**Table 1. The governance structures of UKP3R and UKP4**

Category	UKP3R	UKP4
Legal Basis	Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2006, Presidential Decree No. 21 of 2008	Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2009, Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2012, Presidential Regulation No. 84 of 2014
Main Task	Managing reform programs	Monitoring and controlling development
Priorities	Business/investment climate, bureaucratic reform, SOEs, MSMEs, law enforcement	Logistics system, bureaucratic reform, business/investment climate, SOEs, law enforcement, economic growth
Functions	Setting priorities; addressing bottlenecks; receiving suggestions and complaints; determining quality and governance standards	Managing synchronization and consistency; establishing components and procedures for control; receiving suggestions and complaints; monitoring and analysis; overseeing 15 key priority programs

Priority Setting	Considering policies of Ministries/Agencies, in coordination with the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs	Considering policies of Ministries/Agencies; innovations must comply with statutory regulations; may coordinate with and receive information and technical support from relevant Ministries, Agencies, Local Governments, or other parties
Organizational Structure	Head, 2 Deputies, Assistants, Expert Staff, Special Team. Consultant services upon Presidential approval. Secretariat appointed by the Ministry of State Secretariat based on consideration from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform	Head, 6 Deputies, Professional Personnel consisting of up to 15 expert assistants, up to 30 assistants, up to 20 junior assistants, up to 15 skilled personnel, Special Team, and Task Force. Secretariat appointed by the Ministry of State Secretariat based on consideration from the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. Consultant services upon Presidential approval
Appointment and Dismissal	Head appointed by the President; Deputies appointed by the President based on the Head's recommendation through the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs; other officials appointed by the Head	Head appointed by the President; Deputies appointed by the President based on the Head's recommendation; other officials appointed by the Head
Term of Office	Head and Deputies serve a maximum of 3 years and may be extended; officials may come from civil servants or non-civil servants	Head serves a maximum of 5 years and may be extended; Deputies, Professional Personnel, Special Team, and Task Force members may come from civil servants or non-civil servants
Financial Rights and Benefits	Head equivalent to Ministerial level; Deputies equivalent to echelon I.a; other officials determined by the Head with approval from the Minister of Finance; no pension and/or severance for non-civil servants	Head equivalent to Ministerial level; Deputies equivalent to echelon I.a; Expert Assistants equivalent to echelon I.b; Assistants equivalent to echelon II.a; Junior Assistants and Skilled Personnel equivalent to echelon III.a; non-civil servants are not entitled to pensions and/or severance, while provisions for civil servants are regulated according to civil service regulations
Funding Source	State Secretariat budget	Funded by the State Budget (APBN) or other legitimate sources
Others	-	The Head may recruit personnel as needed; all state assets, documents, and financing managed by UKP3R were transferred to UKP4 upon approval from the Minister of Finance

*Source: Author's Analysis*

Although both UKP3R and UKP4 functioned as Presidential Working Units under the direct authority of the President, with their respective heads granted the right to attend cabinet

meetings, their legal foundations and institutional trajectories differed. UKP3R was established through Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2006 (Keppres), whereas UKP4 was established by Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2009 (Perpres). UKP3R operated for three years during President Yudhoyono's first term before being replaced by UKP4, which remained active throughout his second term. This transition was formally stipulated in UKP4's founding regulation and can be interpreted as part of President Yudhoyono's effort to strengthen and institutionalize the role of Presidential Working Units. The duration of each unit also reflected the tenure of its leadership: the head of UKP3R was appointed for a term of up to three years, subject to extension, while the head of UKP4 could serve for up to five years, with the possibility of renewal.

UKP3R was led by Marsilam Simanjuntak, a respected statesman who had previously served as Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Justice, and Attorney General under President Abdurrahman Wahid. He was supported by two deputies: Agus Widjojo, former Chief of Territorial Affairs of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), who oversaw non-economic affairs; and Edwin Gerungan, former Head of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), responsible for economic affairs. In contrast, UKP4 was headed by Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, a technocrat with a distinguished career as Minister of Mining, CEO of the State Electricity Company (PLN), and Head of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh-Nias (BRR). He recruited his deputies, reflecting a more autonomous leadership style. The appointments of Marsilam and Kuntoro suggest that both individuals were trusted by the President and regarded as credible figures within the framework of deliverology.

The formation of UKP3R, however, encountered political resistance, particularly from the Golkar Party and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who concurrently served as the chairman of Golkar. Objections arose on several grounds: Vice President Jusuf Kalla was excluded from the consultation process; the use of a Presidential Decree, typically reserved for personnel matters, was deemed legally questionable for establishing a working unit; and Marsilam Simanjuntak's appointment was controversial, due to part to his past advocacy for dissolving the Golkar Party. Additionally, the establishment of UKP3R coincided with legislative deliberations on a bill concerning the Presidential Advisory Council (Wantimpres), exacerbating tensions. As a result, UKP3R was perceived as a consultative body with limited authority over ministries and was ultimately overshadowed by the Advisory Council, which had only marginal influence.

In contrast, during the second term, President Yudhoyono—now partnered with Vice President Boediono, a technocrat and economist—granted UKP4 a broader and more authoritative mandate. It was empowered to monitor ministerial performance and report directly to the President, often in coordination with the Vice President. UKP4 remained active until the end of Yudhoyono's presidency and served as a model for other institutions, including some state-owned enterprises. Its notable contributions included the development of quarterly performance reports, the implementation of an action tracker system, the introduction of performance contracts for ministers, and the launch of the LAPOR! Public complaints platform, and oversight of deforestation and emission reduction programs (REDD+). Initially, UKP4's reports were presented during cabinet meetings and made public, increasing transparency but straining relationships with underperforming ministers, particularly those from coalition parties. The later decision to restrict the public release of reports reduced external pressure on ministers but also diminished UKP4's influence. Moreover, in the absence of a legally binding framework mandating compliance with its recommendations, UKP4's ambitious targets often proved difficult for ministries to achieve, leading to reduced bureaucratic morale.

### ***Delivery Units during the Presidency of Joko Widodo***

During President Joko Widodo's administration—initially with Vice President Jusuf Kalla and subsequently with Vice President Ma'ruf Amin—the delivery unit established was not designated as a Presidential Working Unit, but rather took the form of the Presidential Staff Unit, which later evolved into KSP. Although a unit bearing the name Presidential Working Unit was briefly established during this period, its mandate was limited to developing the Pancasila ideology. It was eventually transformed into the Agency for Pancasila Ideology Development (BPIP). The Presidential Staff Unit was originally tasked with providing political communication support and managing strategic issues on behalf of the President and the Vice President. The inclusion of the Vice President in its mandate reflects the institutional positioning of this body as part of the broader presidential apparatus. Under Presidential Regulation No. 190 of 2014, the unit was designated a non-structural institution reporting directly to the President, with its head bearing the title Chief of Presidential Staff, appointed for a term concurrent with the President's. This arrangement was reaffirmed and expanded in Presidential Regulation No. 26 of 2015, which formalized the unit as KSP. A key distinction between the two regulations lies in the omission of the clause in the 2015 regulation that previously required the Chief of Staff to seek presidential guidance when performing political communication functions.

The establishment of KSP marked a significant institutional strengthening initiative by President Joko Widodo. Designed with a broader organizational structure and wider operational mandate, KSP was vested with the authority to coordinate directly and to form ad hoc task forces involving ministries, government agencies, regional governments, and external stakeholders. Its creation absorbed responsibilities previously held by the Cabinet Secretariat and consolidated the functions, resources, and personnel of the dissolved UKP4. The first Chief of Presidential Staff was Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, a retired military general and former minister under President Abdurrahman Wahid, who also headed the institution during its earlier phase as the Presidential Staff Office. The institutional elevation of KSP is widely interpreted as indicative of Luhut's growing political influence within the Joko Widodo administration, as he subsequently served as Coordinating Minister in both of Joko Widodo's presidential terms.

In summary, based on document analysis and regulatory review, the organizational structure and operational framework of the Presidential Staff Office and KSP can be outlined as follows:

**Table 2. The governance structures of Presidential Staff Unit and Presidential Staff Office**

Category	Presidential Staff Unit	Presidential Staff Office
Legal Basis	Presidential Regulation No. 190 of 2014	Presidential Regulation No. 26 of 2015, Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2019
Main Task	Providing political communication support and managing strategic issues for the President and Vice President	Assisting the President and Vice President in controlling national priority programs, political communication, and strategic issue management
Functions	Identification and analysis; strategy recommendations; political communication; monitoring and management; evaluation; reporting and follow-up recommendations	Control; problem-solving; acceleration; monitoring; management of strategic issues; political communication and information dissemination; analysis of strategic data and information; and communication strategies within the Presidential Institution
Organizational Structure	Chief of Presidential Staff; up to 3 Assistant Chiefs; up to 15	Chief of Presidential Staff; Deputy Chief of Presidential Staff; up to 5

	Professional Staff members consisting of Senior, Intermediate, and Junior Professionals; Secretariat whose structure and working procedures are determined by the Minister of State Secretariat with the approval of the Minister for Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform	Deputies; Professional Staff consisting of Principal Experts, Senior Experts, Junior Experts, and Skilled Personnel; Special Teams; Inter-Ministerial/Agency Task Forces; Consultants; Secretariat with structure and work procedures established by the Minister of State Secretariat with the approval of the Minister for Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform; up to 5 Special Advisors
Appointment and Dismissal	Chief appointed by the President; Assistant Chiefs appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chief; Professional Staff appointed by the Chief; may be from civil servants or non-civil servants	Chief and Deputy Chief appointed by the President; Deputies appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chief; Professional Staff and Special Advisors appointed by the Chief; may be from civil servants or non-civil servants
Term of Office	The term of the Chief is aligned with the President's term; Assistant Chiefs and Professional Staff serve for the same duration as the Chief	The term of the Chief is aligned with the President's term; the Deputy Chief, Deputies, Professional Staff, and Special Advisors serve for the same duration as the Chief
Financial Rights and Facilities	Chief equivalent to Ministerial rank; Assistant Chiefs equivalent to echelon I.b; Senior Professional equivalent to echelon II.b; Intermediate Professional equivalent to echelon III.a; Junior Professional equivalent to echelon IV.a; Non-civil servants are not entitled to pensions and/or severance pay; provisions for civil servants follow civil service regulations	Chief equivalent to Ministerial rank; Deputy Chief equivalent to Vice Minister rank; Deputies equivalent to echelon I.a; Principal Experts and Special Advisors equivalent to echelon I.b; Senior Experts equivalent to echelon II.a; Junior Experts and Skilled Personnel equivalent to echelon III.a; Non-civil servants are not entitled to pensions and/or severance pay; provisions for civil servants follow civil service regulations
Working Procedures	Regulated by the Chief of Presidential Staff	Organizational units coordinate regularly or as needed; units implement internal control systems; unit leaders supervise subordinates
Funding Source	Sourced from the State Budget (APBN)	Sourced from the State Budget (APBN) and other legitimate sources
Others	—	The Chief of the Presidential Staff Unit continued in office under KSP; initial funding utilized UKP4's budget; temporarily revoked the Cabinet Secretary's role in restructuring presidential organizational units; disbanded both UKP4 and the Presidential Staff Unit

*Source: Author's Analysis*

From political figure Teten Masduki to former Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Moeldoko, the Chief of Presidential Staff has remained operational across both

terms of President Joko Widodo's administration. Its institutional continuity can be attributed to the gradual expansion of its duties, authority, and resources—an evolution shaped by insights and lessons from prior delivery units. Nonetheless, KSP has not been immune to criticism. A primary concern involves functional overlaps with other presidential support bodies, including the Vice President, the Coordinating Ministries, and the Ministry of State Secretariat—all of which are more firmly embedded within the constitutional structure. Additionally, several of KSP's core functions had historically been carried out by pre-existing institutions such as Bappenas, the Cabinet Secretariat, the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and various Presidential Envoys and Special Advisors. Institutional critiques have highlighted issues such as budget inefficiency, bureaucratic redundancy, and fragmentation that arise from the creation of new structures. These concerns have heightened expectations for KSP to demonstrate stronger accountability and operational effectiveness.

### ***Delivery Units during the Presidency of Prabowo Subianto***

At the outset of President Prabowo Subianto's administration, there was a marked increase in the number and complexity of ministries, government agencies, and presidential support structures tasked with coordination, synchronization, and development control. This expansion included the establishment of seven Coordinating Ministries, alongside several key ministries that report directly to the President and are not placed under any coordinating ministry. These ministries include the Ministry of State Secretariat, the Ministry of National Development Planning/Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of PAN-RB. In parallel, 43 deputy ministerial positions were established across two coordinating ministries and 41 line ministries, signaling a significant institutional broadening. In addition to the existing institutional framework, several new bodies were created to enhance presidential control and policy execution. These included PCO, the National Economic Council, Bappisu, and a restructured Cabinet Secretariat, which now operates under the Presidential Military Secretariat within the Ministry of State Secretariat. Furthermore, the presidential apparatus was strengthened through the appointment of numerous advisory roles, including Special Advisors to the President, Presidential Envoys, and Presidential Special Staff. The following section presents a document-based institutional analysis of the ministerial and presidential support structures during the early phase of President Prabowo Subianto's term, focusing on the organization, function, and political positioning of these entities within the broader governance framework.

**Table 3. Delivery Institution/Entity under the Presidency of Prabowo Subianto**

Institution/Entity	Legal Basis	Mandate	Composition
Coordinating Ministries	Law No. 61 of 2024, Presidential Regulation No. 139 of 2024	Synchronization and coordination of the Ministries under their purview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Politics and Security</li> <li>- Law, Human Rights, Immigration, and Corrections</li> <li>- Economic Affairs</li> <li>- Human Development and Culture</li> <li>- Infrastructure and Regional Development</li> <li>- Community Empowerment</li> <li>- Food Affairs</li> </ul>
Ministries Directly under the President	Law No. 61 of 2024, Presidential Regulation No. 139 of 2024	Administration of governmental affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- State Secretariat</li> <li>- Bappenas</li> <li>- Ministry of Finance</li> <li>- Ministry of PAN-RB</li> </ul>

Vice Ministers	Law No. 39 of 2008, Presidential Regulation No. 140 of 2024	Assisting Ministers in policymaking and inter-unit coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1 Vice Minister each for: Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, and Coordinating Ministry for Law, Human Rights, Immigration, and Corrections</li> <li>- 3 Vice Ministers each for: Foreign Affairs, Finance, and State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN)</li> <li>- 2 Vice Ministers each for: State Secretariat, Home Affairs, Basic and Secondary Education, Higher Education, Science and Technology, Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, and Communication and Digital Affairs</li> <li>- 1 Vice Minister for each of the other Ministries</li> <li>- Chief</li> <li>- Deputy for Communication Materials and Information</li> <li>- Deputy for Dissemination and Media Information</li> <li>- Deputy for Information Coordination and Communication Evaluation</li> <li>- Presidential Spokesperson</li> <li>- Chief</li> <li>- Deputy for Supervision and Control</li> <li>- Deputy for Monitoring and Investigation</li> </ul>
Presidential Communication Office	Presidential Regulation No. 82 of 2024	Supporting the implementation of communication and information related to the President's strategic policies and priority programs	
Agency for Development Control and Special Investigation	Presidential Regulation No. 159 of 2024	Supporting the oversight, control, monitoring, and investigation of development program implementation and activities	
Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Support Secretariat	Presidential Regulation No. 148 of 2024	<p>Cabinet Secretary: coordination of scheduling for presidential activities and meetings chaired by the President.</p> <p>Cabinet Support Secretariat: Cabinet Management</p>	<p>The Cabinet Secretary operates under the Presidential Military Secretariat.</p> <p>The Cabinet Secretariat has been replaced by the Cabinet Support Secretariat, which consists of the following deputies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deputy for Politics, Law, Security, and Human Rights</li> <li>• Deputy for the Economy</li> <li>• Deputy for Human Development, Culture, and Community Empowerment</li> </ul>

- Deputy for Food, Infrastructure, and Regional Development
- Deputy for Cabinet Sessions
- Deputy for Administration

*Source: Author's Analysis*

The number of Coordinating Ministries increased to seven, and the number of ministries overall rose to 41. These changes were enabled by revisions to the State Ministry Law at the end of President Joko Widodo's term, who is also the father of Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka. Similarly, regulations supporting the formation of the National Nutrition Agency, the Presidential Communication Office, and the positions of Special Advisors, Special Envoys, and Presidential Special Staff were enacted during this period. The Coordinating Minister positions—overseeing line ministers in their respective sectors—are now predominantly held by leaders of political parties, including former Chair of the Crescent Star Party Yusril Ihza Mahendra, former Chair of the Golkar Party Airlangga Hartarto, Democratic Party Chair Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, National Awakening Party Chair Muhamimin Iskandar, and National Mandate Party Chair Zulkifli Hasan. Among the ministries that report directly to the President are the Ministry of State Secretariat, led by Prasetyo Hadi, and Bappenas, led by Rachmat Pambudy—both of whom are cadres of the Gerindra Party, chaired by President Prabowo Subianto. The Ministry of Finance remains under the leadership of Sri Mulyani, who previously served in the same capacity during the administrations of Presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo. The Ministry of PAN-RB is now headed by Rini Widayantini, who previously served as Secretary of the same ministry. Moreover, deputy ministerial appointments, originally intended for ministries with heavy workloads, have now been expanded across all ministries.

Regarding PCO and Bappisus, both of which assumed functions previously under KSP, the PCO focuses on presidential political communication and information dissemination. At the same time, Bappisus is responsible for addressing issues that emerge during the physical implementation of development projects. The PCO's functions closely align with those of the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs. In contrast, Bappisus operates similarly to the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), although its focus is more specifically directed toward financial oversight and project management. The PCO is headed by Hasan Nasbi, whom President Joko Widodo appointed at the end of his administration. Aries Marsudiyanto, the founder of the National Movement for Loving Prabowo Subianto, leads Bappisus. Likewise, the current Chief of Presidential Staff at the KSP is Anto Mukti Putranto, who previously served as Special Assistant to the Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto.

The current Cabinet Secretary is Teddy Indra Wijaya, who formerly served as an aide to Prabowo Subianto during his tenure as Minister of Defense. Initially announced alongside the appointment of ministers and even featured in the official cabinet photograph, his appointment was formalized concurrently with that of the deputy ministers. However, public concerns were raised regarding the appointment of an active military officer to a civilian position. This led to the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 148 of 2024, stipulating that the position of Cabinet Secretary may be filled by an active-duty military officer of echelon IIa rank, operating under the Presidential Military Secretariat. This office is tasked with coordinating the President's activity schedule and presiding over meetings chaired by the President. The role has since been reinforced through amendments to the Law on the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). The Cabinet Secretariat, previously equivalent in status to a ministry, has now been restructured under the Ministry of State Secretariat (Setneg) as the Cabinet Support Secretariat. A Chief of Secretariat leads this secretariat and comprises six deputies: a Deputy for Politics, Law, Security, and Human Rights; a Deputy for Economic Affairs; a Deputy for Human

Development, Culture, and Community Empowerment; a Deputy for Food, Infrastructure, and Regional Development; a Deputy for Cabinet Sessions; and a Deputy for Administration.

### ***Analysis of Institutional Change Processes***

The establishment of delivery units in Indonesia, beginning with the administrations of Presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Joko Widodo, and Prabowo Subianto, demonstrates a persistent pattern of “path dependence” characterised by a temporary nature and a weak legal foundation. This pattern continues because institutions such as UKP3R, UKP4, KSP, PCO, and Bappisus have consistently been created through lower-level legal instruments, namely Presidential Decrees or Presidential Regulations, rather than through stronger statutory legislation. This fragile legal basis reflects the positioning of these institutions as direct extensions of executive authority, functioning as “ad hoc political instruments” highly dependent on the personal support of the sitting leader. Since these units are not systematically integrated into the formal bureaucratic structure, they remain vulnerable to leadership changes and short-term political interests, underscoring their persistent failure to become institutionalised as sustainable long-term governance instruments.

The transition from UKP4 to KSP under President Joko Widodo represents an important “critical juncture” intended to strengthen the oversight capacity of national programs. KSP was established as a significant institutional reinforcement initiative with a broader operational mandate and absorbed the functions, resources, and personnel of the dissolved UKP4. Although KSP achieved remarkable operational continuity throughout President Joko Widodo’s two terms in office, thanks to its expanded authority and resources, the unit ultimately failed to achieve systemic institutional durability. This failure again stems from its weak legal foundation. KSP was formalised through a Presidential Regulation rather than a permanent legal framework. As a result, its resilience remained highly dependent on leadership style and political dynamics, rendering it a pragmatic mechanism rather than a permanent instrument of the state.

A comparative analysis reveals a consistent pattern in terms of the legal foundation and the personalisation of leadership across all units. The legal basis for UKP3R through a Presidential Decree, and for UKP4, KSP, PCO, and Bappisus through Presidential Regulations, demonstrates the same fundamental weakness, namely, regulations issued at the executive level that are vulnerable to alteration. At the same time, leadership personalisation plays a central role. UKP3R was led by Marsilam Simanjuntak and UKP4 by Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, both trusted figures of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Similarly, the initial elevation of KSP was significantly shaped by its first Chief of Staff, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who wielded substantial political influence. In the Prabowo administration, PCO and Bappisus have also been headed by individuals closely associated with the inner circle of political authority, such as Hasan Nasbi and Aries Marsudiyanto. Meanwhile, functional overlap remains a chronic issue. KSP faced criticism for overlapping with the Vice President, the Coordinating Ministries, and the Ministry of State Secretariat. In the Prabowo administration, PCO and Bappisus are also assumed to have overlapping functions with the downsized KSP, the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs in the case of PCO, and BPKP in the case of Bappisus, although Bappisus has a stronger focus on oversight and investigation of physical development projects.

### ***Potential Institutional Weaknesses and Their Implications for Public Policy***

An analysis of delivery units in Indonesia demonstrates that weak institutional continuity, or ‘low institutional durability,’ has direct implications for national priority policy outcomes. The existence of these units is highly contextual, temporary, and dependent on the leadership style of the sitting President as well as short-term political considerations. When the performance of a unit, such as KSP, is driven by personalized leadership and the political

influence of appointed figures like Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan or Moeldoko, the unit's functional endurance is not embedded in the system. As a result, 'the policy framework' advanced by these units becomes highly vulnerable to political cycles and administrative turnover. The failure of these units to persist systemically across administrations means that long-term national priority agendas, which should extend beyond the term of a single President, tend to become fragmented, revised, or abandoned entirely during leadership transitions.

Delivery units should not be viewed merely as new organizational structures, but rather as 'policy instruments' specifically designed to address weaknesses in implementation and coordination within government. However, these instruments consistently fail to become institutionalized because they are established through Presidential Regulations or Presidential Decrees, which represent weak legal foundations that lack the authority of higher-level laws, such as statutes enacted by the legislature. This position renders them extensions of the President or ad hoc political instruments rather than integrated components of the formal bureaucracy. This structural weakness is compounded by accountability challenges within Indonesia's multiparty political system. For example, UKP4 faced tensions because its transparent performance reporting strained relations with underperforming ministers, especially those from coalition parties. In a context where ministerial loyalty may be directed more toward the political parties that support them rather than full compliance with directives from the President or oversight units, the absence of binding legal mechanisms to enforce adherence to unit recommendations, such as those issued by UKP4, makes it difficult to achieve ambitious targets and weakens bureaucratic morale.

The failure of institutionalization is also closely related to problems of systemic integration and overlapping mandates. Because these units are created outside the formal bureaucratic system, there is no clear mechanism to integrate their roles into permanent interagency relationships. The lack of a strong legal basis and the absence of structural integration require these units to compete with other central government institutions for authority, resources, and political attention. This significantly limits their ability to perform coordination, evaluation, and oversight functions consistently and sustainably over the long term. Given these institutional weaknesses, the most urgent policy implication is the need to strengthen state capacity in the implementation of long-term programs. Institutionalization efforts should be understood as a strategic policy approach to achieving effective governance. To build institutional resilience, recommendations call for establishing these units on a stronger legal foundation, such as legislation enacted by the legislature, integrating them systematically into the governmental structure, and leadership grounded in technical expertise rather than political loyalty. Embedding oversight and control functions on a permanent basis would ensure that the implementation of public policy, especially priority programs, does not depend solely on the discretion and political lifespan of any single leader but becomes an embedded strategic instrument for achieving development objectives.

## Conclusion

This study finds that the existence of delivery units in Indonesia is highly contextual and often temporary. The transformation of entities such as UKP3R, UKP4, KSP, PCO, and Bappisu has not been grounded in strong institutional foundations. Rather, these units have generally depended on the leadership style of the sitting President, short-term political considerations, and evolving power dynamics among state institutions. As a result, they exhibit limited institutional durability, that is, a lack of capacity to persist, adapt, and function consistently across different administrations. While some control-oriented features of the deliverology approach have been introduced, such as a focus on outcomes, the use of performance targets, and the establishment of cross-sectoral teams, these mechanisms have not been fully embedded within Indonesia's broader governance system. The absence of permanent legal frameworks, overlapping mandates, and the predominance of political factors have continued to hinder

meaningful institutionalization. Comparative evidence from other countries suggests units are more likely to operate effectively when several key conditions are met. These include formal integration into the government structure, establishment through strong legal instruments such as legislation passed by parliament, and deployment as a strategic tool when existing ministries or agencies fail to perform adequately.

Furthermore, success often hinges on the use of data-driven and results-based working methods that are aligned with national priorities, supported by formal performance agreements between institutions, and reinforced through ongoing oversight and monitoring. Delivery units should also maintain professional autonomy while functioning as an extension of executive authority to support the implementation of priority programs. To uphold credibility and ensure accountability, leadership appointments within these units should be based on technical expertise and professional experience rather than political loyalty. Although such an approach may raise concerns about depoliticization, it is essential to protect the institution's integrity and effectiveness. In conclusion, the establishment of a delivery unit that enhances institutional capacity in policy implementation reflects a public leader's commitment to realizing development goals and achieving effective governance in the service of citizen well-being.

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