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Multi-party Systems and Parliamentary Thresholds: The Case of Indonesia's Presidential System with Comparisons to Germany and Taiwan

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Abstract

Abstract This study investigates the necessity of parliamentary thresholds in multi-party and presidential systems, with a particular focus on Indonesia. It examines the rationale behind these thresholds and the factors that should determine the optimal threshold within Indonesia's unique political landscape. Employing a qualitative approach and a comprehensive literature review, the study utilizes Mainwaring's framework, which highlights the challenges posed by the combination of a multi-party system and presidentialism, and advocates for reducing the number of parties through appropriate thresholds. The findings suggest that Indonesia's combination of a presidential system and multi-party structure can lead to instability due to potential legislative gridlock. To enhance government efficiency, the study recommends maintaining or raising the current 4% parliamentary threshold and opposes calls to lower it, as this could lead to further fragmentation and inefficiency. Furthermore, the study proposes simplifying the structure of Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) into three factions: pro-government, opposition, and independent. By drawing comparisons with Germany and Taiwan's 5% thresholds and mixed-member proportional representation systems, the study suggests that similar electoral reforms in Indonesia could minimize wasted votes, improve proportional representation, and foster a more stable governance structure.

Abstrak Paper ini membahas perlunya ambang batas parlemen dalam sistem multi-partai dan presidensialisme, dengan fokus Indonesia. Paper ini mengidentifikasi faktor-faktor yang seharusnya menentukan ambang batas optimal untuk lingkungan politik Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dan tinjauan pustaka yang mendalam, penelitian ini mengadopsi pemikiran Mainwaring, yang menyoroti tantangan dalam kombinasi sistem presidensial dan multi-partai serta memberikan rekomendasi pengurangan jumlah partai melalui ambang batas yang sesuai. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kombinasi sistem presidensial dan multipartai di Indonesia dapat menyebabkan ketidakstabilan karena potensi kebuntuan di legislatif. Untuk meningkatkan efisiensi pemerintahan, studi ini merekomendasikan untuk mempertahankan atau menaikkan ambang batas parlemen dari 4% saat ini dan menolak usulan untuk menurunkannya, karena hal tersebut akan memperparah fragmentasi dan inefisiensi. Selain itu, studi ini mengusulkan penyederhanaan struktur fraksi di Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) menjadi tiga fraksi saja: pendukung pemerintah, oposisi, dan independen. Dengan melakukan studi perbandingan ambang batas 5% yang diterapkan di Jerman dan Taiwan dengan sistem pemilu proporsional campuran, penelitian ini mengusulkan reformasi pemilu serupa di Indonesia. Perubahan ini diharapkan dapat mengurangi suara yang terbuang, meningkatkan keterwakilan secara proporsional, dan mendorong pemerintahan yang lebih stabil.

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BACKGROUND

The combined presidential system and multiparty system theoretically lead to a less stable government (Mainwaring 1990; 1993; Linz, 1990). With multiple parties holding power, building consensus and passing laws becomes challenging, potentially leading to gridlock and inefficiency. The government has to form coalition parties to ensure it has majority support in parliament. However, this condition can weaken the president as he is not free to determine the direction of policies and programs due to being hostage to the interests of the coalition parties. Democracy can also be hijacked by the interests of coalition parties and their factions rather than for the nation's national interest. Therefore, simplifying the number of political parties becomes an important issue in multiparty systems and presidential systems such as Indonesia.

According to Duverger, the electoral system is related to the multiparty system (Chapman, 1955). Duverger's law states that the use of a single-ballot simple majority system tends to favor a two-party system. Conversely, according to Duverger's hypotheses, systems that use either a simple majority system with a second round or proportional representation tend to favor the presence of multiple parties (Riker, 1982; Forand, J.G., Maheshri, 2015). This hypothesis has been confirmed for Indonesia's electoral and party systems.

The adoption of proportional representation (PR) into Indonesia's electoral system has had a profound effect on the country's political landscape. PR is an electoral system in which legislative seats are allocated according to the percentage of votes each party or coalition receives. This approach differs from systems such as plurality voting, where the candidate with the most votes wins, even if they do not secure a majority.

In countries that use PR, including Indonesia, this system encourages the formation of multiple political parties by allowing smaller parties to gain parliamentary representation based on their share of the vote. This is particularly beneficial in diverse societies, as it ensures that a wide range of views are represented in government. It also encourages competition among parties, which can lead to more dynamic and responsive governance.

Reducing the number of political parties is essential in Indonesia's presidential system. This is because the system works best with fewer parties and typically recognizes only two groups in parliament: the opposition and the government supporters (MKRI, 2008). To achieve this, the number of parties allowed to participate in elections and enter parliament should be limited by using the electoral threshold (ET) and the Parliamentary Threshold (PT) as outlined in the Political Parties Law and the Election Law. This paper elaborates on the question: Why is the parliamentary threshold needed in multi-party and presidential systems, particularly in the context of Indonesia? What factors determine the optimal parliamentary threshold for Indonesia's multi-party system?

The parliamentary threshold, also known as the electoral threshold, is a method used in many democratic systems to ensure that only political parties with sufficient support are represented in legislative bodies. This threshold is usually defined as a percentage of the total number of votes cast in an election; if a party does not meet this minimum percentage, it is not entitled to seats in parliament or other representative institutions. The reasons for setting such a threshold vary, but the primary goal is to improve the stability and effectiveness of the political system.

Electoral thresholds in multiparty and presidential systems, such as Indonesia's, have been a contentious issue since the reformation era, starting with the 1999 elections. Hutabarat and Affandi (2020) highlight the threshold's potential to minimize divisions and encourage coalition-building, but also its potential to reduce public participation and lead to political transactions. The threshold concept, while effective in minimizing divisions in the electoral process, can also reduce public participation in democracy and give rise to policy transactions (Wutoy et al., 2022). Over the years, the number of political parties participating in Indonesia's legislative elections has fluctuated, while the PT requirement has generally increased from

2.50% in 2009 to 4% in 2019 and 2024. However, the Constitutional Court's decision no. 116/PUU-XXI/2023, has ordered the legislature to recalculate the parliamentary threshold for the 2029 Indonesian elections (2024/02/29).

This research used Mainwaring's framework, emphasizing the difficulties arising from the coexistence of multiple parties and a presidential system and the need to reduce the number of parties by setting an appropriate parliamentary threshold percentage. The preliminary argument of the paper is the increased parliamentary thresholds can contribute to more stable governments by limiting the number of parties in the parliament, simplifying coalition dynamics, and reducing the influence of fringe parties. However, this needs to be balanced to avoid overly high thresholds that could undermine democratic inclusiveness.

LITERATURE REVIEW

After Indonesia gained independence in 1945, the first election was held in 1955, with participation from over 100 parties. However, only 28 political parties secured seats. The four major parties represented in the DPR (House of Representatives) were the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the Masyumi Party, the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (NU), and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Following Sukarno's resignation and Suharto's rise to power, communist parties were banned in Indonesia. Suharto simplified the political landscape by merging the parties into just three: the United Development Party (PPP), formed from a coalition of Islamic parties; the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), formed from the merger of nationalist and Christian parties; and Golongan Karya (Golkar), the functional party that dominated politics for 32 years (Ratnawati & Haris, 2008; Wardhana, 2023).

Following the 1998 reforms, Indonesia reestablished a multiparty system that allowed for the formation and operation of numerous political parties. This transition, based on democratic ideals, marked a significant shift from the previous centralized system dominated by a single ruling party, the Golkar, under military leadership. The multiparty system was crucial in fostering political diversity and providing voters with a wide range of choices in elections (Sugiharto, 2019).

Political parties are central to Indonesia's multiparty system. They facilitate political communication, socialization, recruitment, and regulation. Parties express societal interests and translate them into clear policy proposals and visions that can shape state policy. This function is essential in a democracy to ensure that the government represents the diverse interests of its citizens (Sugiharto, 2019). However, multiparty in the presidential system could be problematic as outlined previously by Mainwaring's (1993) framework. Mainwaring provides empirical evidence from Latin American democracies, where the combination of presidentialism and multi-party systems has often led to democratic instability. He highlights the difficulties of coalition building in multiparty presidential systems, where the chief executive's party rarely enjoys a majority in the legislature. It suggests that building stable coalitions is considerably more difficult in multiparty presidential democracies.

Moreover, the empirical analysis demonstrates that countries with fewer parties (or dominant party systems) tend to have more stable presidential regimes compared to those with highly fragmented party systems. Mainwaring contrasts presidential systems with parliamentary systems, noting that parliamentary systems tend to handle multiparty dynamics more effectively due to the nature of executive-legislative fusion and the flexibility of government formation. He also considers semi-presidential systems, which blend features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism and their varied success depending on the specific institutional configurations and political contexts.

Additionally, Linz (1990) argues that presidentialism itself, by nature, tends to be more prone to instability and conflict than parliamentary systems. A key issue identified by Linz is dual legitimacy, where both the president and legislature, elected independently, each claim to

represent the people's will. This can lead to conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, especially when controlled by different parties, potentially causing governmental paralysis and hindering effective governance. Presidential elections' winner-takes-all nature can also marginalize minority groups and discourage political compromise. Linz suggests that strengthening political parties can reduce the risks associated with presidentialism. Strong parties can moderate political competition and foster cooperation between the executive and legislature. Cultivating a political culture that emphasizes compromise and consensus-building is essential, as it can counteract the winner-takes-all mindset and promote more inclusive governance.

Widayati & Winanto (2019) and Aris (2022), argues that the combination of a presidential system and a multi-party system in Indonesia has posed challenges to the stability and effectiveness of governance. Therefore, in the context of Indonesia, the parliamentary threshold is a crucial mechanism for dealing with the intricacies of the country's multiparty system (Gunanto & Sulaiman, 2022; Widiastuti, 2020; Hamudy & Rifki, 2019). By limiting the number of parties in the legislature, the threshold can improve legislative efficiency, simplify government operations, and strengthen the presidential system. While higher thresholds can lead to more stable governments, they also risk sidelining smaller parties and minority groups, which could undermine democratic inclusiveness. This underscores the difficulty of striking a balance between effective governance and inclusive representation (Gunanto & Sulaiman, 2022; Ansari et al., 2022).

According to Sutisna (2015), after the 1998 reform, Indonesia's shift to an extreme multiparty system led to significant challenges in achieving stable and effective governance. Despite the increase in political participation and the growth of democracy indicated by the multiparty system, this system proved to be problematic, as it often resulted in the inefficiency of government. Simplifying the party system and adopting a moderate multiparty framework is considered more appropriate for Indonesia's presidential system. In a moderate multiparty system, the effective number of political parties in parliament typically ranges from three to five (Coppedge, 1998). Ideally, this arrangement would rationalize political power and create a clear division between the winning party as the supporter government and the opposition (Sutisna, 2015).

Furthermore Suparto (2021) proposed a solution to strengthen presidentialism in Indonesia by raising the threshold from 4% in the 2019 election to 8% in the 2024 election. With this percentage, according to Suparto (2021), the party in parliament is only about 4 to 6 parties. However, some concerns raise the threshold too high, which could sideline smaller political parties that represent minority voices. These parties often represent specific interest groups that may not be adequately represented by larger, more dominant political organizations. Excluding them could result in a democratic deficit, with voters from these minority groups feeling disconnected from the political process. Hence, balancing the need for government efficiency with ensuring inclusive political representation remains an ongoing challenge in Indonesia's multiparty system. As the country continues to adjust its electoral framework, striking the right balance between these competing priorities will be critical to its political development.

METHODS

The paper uses a qualitative approach and a literature review method, with the source data gathered from journals, books, government official websites, and news reports that cover the case. The data were analyzed using thematic analysis to explore and identify key patterns, aligning to gain deeper insights into the subject of parliamentary thresholds in multi-party systems and address the research question. In addition, the paper uses a comparative approach to compare Indonesia's parliamentary threshold with Germany's and Taiwan's. The purpose of

doing a comparison in qualitative research is to explore the diversity of experiences or phenomena within the study and to generate deeper insights into the subject of study. This comparative approach allows researchers to identify patterns, understand different perspectives, and develop a more detailed understanding of the research topic (Hennink, M., Hutter, I. and Bailey, 2020). Germany is known as the origin of the threshold system (formal thresholds), which was designed to address the issue of party fragmentation, a significant concern in multi-party democracies. The German electoral system is categorized as a personalized proportional representation system, which is referred to in New Zealand as the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system (The Federal Returning Officer, 2017). This threshold, set at a maximum of 5 per cent, has been adopted by other countries with similar electoral concerns, including Taiwan.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The parliamentary threshold is a rule that requires political parties to secure a certain percentage of the total vote in order to win seats in parliament. In Indonesia, this threshold has changed over time based on updates to the election law. This requirement prevents the political landscape from becoming too fragmented by limiting the number of parties that can enter parliament. This is intended to improve political stability, allow for more effective governance, and simplify the coalition-building process.

The parliamentary threshold affects the number of votes that do not translate into parliamentary seats. In a proportional representation system, such votes are termed wasted votes (Pratama & Maharddika, 2020; Maftuh, 2020). This problem particularly affects small parties that fail to secure seats, resulting in their supporters' votes being wasted and contributing to disproportionality under the proportional system. For instance, in the 2024 election, 17,304,303 votes were considered wasted, an increase from 13,595,842 wasted votes in the 2019 election (Perludem, 2024).

Based on the proposal by Perludem (Association for Elections and Democracy, Indonesia) in their argument to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, the effective parliamentary threshold should ideally be set at 1%. This is based on the use of the effective threshold formula proposed by Estonian political scientist Rein Taagepera to determine the new minimum vote requirement. However, many parties argue that this number is too low and may exacerbate fragmentation in the House of Representatives. Therefore, the percentage of the parliamentary threshold remains a contentious issue in the upcoming Indonesian election in 2029 (BBCnews Indonesia, 2024). Determining the percentage figure for the parliamentary threshold does not have a fixed formula in various countries. In other words, it is based on political agreements between political parties and the government (Siahaan, 2016).

On the other hand, despite the increasing parliamentary threshold, fragmentation in the DPR remains significant with eight parties, and no single party is dominant, as shown in Table 2. These parties are PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya), Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya), Nasdem (Partai Nasional Demokrat), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional), and Demokrat (Partai Demokrat). Meanwhile, for the first time since the 1999 elections, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) won no seats in parliament. The configuration of party coalitions may change after the elections or even after the inauguration on October 20, 2024. Four of these eight parties supported the president-elect and vice president, Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, before the election. The winning coalition—comprising Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, and Demokrat—holds 48.25% of the seats in the DPR, necessitating a coalition with other parties to achieve a majority. The presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously, and there are 580 seats in parliament for the 2024-2029 period.

The need to form coalitions in this context can lead to unstable coalitions that complicate the president's ability to implement agendas and maintain political stability, as described by Mainwaring (1990). Presidents often resort to patronage to build support, distributing valuable resources such as jobs, contracts, or other benefits to influential politicians. While this approach can help maintain a stable coalition and ensure support for policies, it can also lead to allegations of corruption and nepotism. For example, during Jokowi's presidency (2014-2024), five ministers from coalition political parties were alleged of corruption (CNN-Indonesia, 2023). The coalition system, which results in a compromise-based cabinet, contributes to corruption and weak governance. Corruption is one of the core issues in Indonesia's government, significantly hindering the stability and ability of the government to function efficiently, with political parties being major contributors to this problem (Faiki, 2023).

Table 1. Number of parties in parliament with and without parliamentary threshold in the Indonesian elections

Election Year	Party Participants	Threshold Requirement	Number of Party in Parliament
2004	24	-	17
2009	38	2.50%	9
2014	12	3.50%	10
2019	16	4%	9
2024	18	4%	8

Source: Compiled from many resources by the author

As can be seen in Table 1, without a parliamentary threshold, a higher number of parties entered parliament, representing a wider range of political voices but potentially leading to more fragmentation. The introduction of a 2.5% PT in the 2009 election significantly reduced the number of parties in parliament from 17 to 9 parties, likely reducing fragmentation and promoting more stable governance. Meanwhile, in the 2014 election, a higher PT of 3.5% with fewer party participants surprisingly allowed more parties to secure seats (10 parties), suggesting a more competitive environment and indicating an ease for parties to pass the threshold. In the 2019 election, increasing the PT to 4% further slightly limited the number of parties in parliament. Finally, in the 2024 election, the number of parties in parliament decreased slightly to 8 parties in parliament, suggesting that the 4% PT somehow effectively filters out smaller parties but not significantly, leading to a more efficient legislative process.

Overall, the use of a PT in Indonesian elections has streamlined the composition of parliament and created a more manageable system, although, as Table 2 shows, it has not yet resulted in a dominant party in parliament.

Table 2. Results of Parliamentary Elections (Major Pary), 1999-2024 (percentage)

No.	Party	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019	2024
1	PDIP	33.74	18.53	14.03	18.95	19.33	16.72
2	Golkar	22.44	21.58	14.45	14.75	12.31	15.28
3	PKB	12.61	10.57	4.94	9.04	9.69	10.61
4	PPP	10.71	8.51	5.32	6.53	4.52	3.87
5	PAN	7.12	6.44	6.01	7.59	6.84	7.23

Karmel Hebron Simatupang

Multi-party Systems and Parliamentary Thresholds: The Case of Indonesia's Presidential System with Comparisons to Germany and Taiwan

6	PK/PKS	1.36	7.34	7.88	6.79	8.21	8.42
7	Demokrat	-	7.45	20.85	10.19	7.77	7.43
8	Gerindra	-	-	4.46	11.81	12.57	13.22
9	Nasdem	-	-	-	6.72	9.05	9.65

Source: Indonesia Election Commission, (Fionna & Tomsa, 2020), and the author

Data show in Table 2 that several large parties dominate, while smaller parties struggle to meet the minimum requirements for representation, leading to their gradual decline (as seen with the PPP). Larger parties benefit from this system by consolidating support, but it also limits the representation of smaller and newer parties, potentially excluding minority interests. The increase in the vote share of new parties, such as Nasdem and Gerindra, shows that the threshold does not completely prevent the entry of new political forces. However, the influence of the threshold is visible in the lower performance of older, smaller parties, suggesting that only those able to consolidate significant voter bases or appeal to broad segments of society survive. Over time, this system has pushed Indonesia toward a more moderate multiparty system, in line with calls for greater stability in the presidential system. The steady but uneven performance of the major parties across elections also highlights the dynamic nature of Indonesia's multiparty democracy. In a complex electoral environment, parties must constantly adapt to changing voter preferences, alliances, and the challenges posed by the parliamentary threshold. Nevertheless, the political landscape with eight parties is still seen as an extreme multiparty system. According to the literature, a presidential system with three to five parties in parliament could be more effective and manageable. The question of whether Indonesia should increase the percentage of thresholds or keep the percentage at 4% can be further analyzed through a comparison with other countries. However, decreasing the percentage of the threshold is not recommended based on these findings. A smaller number of parties would likely lead to greater efficiency in decision-making and more coherent governance, as coalition-building would involve fewer parties, consistent with the literature's recommendation for presidential systems.

Comparisons with Germany and Taiwan

The parliamentary threshold significantly influences the dynamics of a multiparty system. There is an inherent trade-off between low and high thresholds. Lower thresholds allow more parties to win parliamentary seats, increasing representation but potentially leading to fragmentation and instability. In contrast, higher thresholds limit the number of parties, promoting stability at the expense of reduced representation.

As Duverger noted, the electoral system is closely related to the multiparty system, in which proportional representation tends to favor the presence of multiple parties. Table 3 shows that Indonesia uses a purely proportional representation system with an open-list format, while Germany and Taiwan employ mixed-member proportional representation. Germany operates under a parliamentary system, whereas Taiwan has a semi-presidential system. Comparative political studies suggest that parliamentary and semi-presidential systems tend to be more stable democratic forms of government than presidential systems, particularly when combined with a multiparty system (Mainwaring, 1990). Therefore, hypothetically, the governments of Germany and Taiwan are more stable than that of Indonesia. This is because Germany's parliamentary system is directly dependent on the confidence of the legislature. In a multiparty system, this often results in coalition governments, where parties work together to form a majority. Taiwan has a semi-presidential system in which the president and the legislature share power, and the prime minister is accountable to the legislature. This system can balance the power of the executive and legislative branches and promote stability in a multiparty context.

Germany is known to have a relatively stable multiparty system characterized by a few major parties and several smaller ones. The 5% threshold helps prevent excessive fragmentation, encouraging smaller parties to merge or form coalitions before elections. Originating in Germany, the threshold system includes "back-door routes" allowing a party to bypass the 5% threshold if it wins at least three direct mandates (constituency seats), even if it does not secure 5% of the national vote.

In the 2021 German federal election, six political parties won seats in the Bundestag, Germany's federal parliament (Khorolskaya, 2021). These parties are the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), Alliance 90/The Greens (Grüne), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and The Left (Die Linke). Although the CDU and CSU are technically separate parties, they form a joint parliamentary group known as the Union, often considered as one entity in federal elections. Therefore, there are six distinct parliamentary groups in the Bundestag.

While Taiwan's political system is characterized by a dominant party system with several minor parties. The 5% threshold reduces the number of smaller parties in the legislature, aiming for more streamlined and stable governance. Taiwan adopted the German model of the "back-door routes" rule, but no one political party had ever entered the Legislative Yuan (unicameral legislative of Taiwan) through these routes until the 2024 election, which means it is hard for smaller parties to win in three district seats directly. In the January 2024 legislative election, only three parties secured seats in the Legislative Yuan: the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP). The DPP and KMT consistently remain the two leading parties in the Legislative Yuan, fostering stability and efficiency within the Taiwanese government by minimizing party fragmentation.

Table 3. Parliamentary Threshold Characteristics and Mechanisms, Comparison of 3 Countries

Country	Parliamentary Threshold	Electoral System	Number of parties in Parliament	Threshold Mechanism if the party does not pass PT
Indonesia	4%	Proportional Representation (PR)	8 (as of 2024)	No back door routes to parliament
Germany	5%	Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP)	6 (as of 2021)	"back-door routes": win at least three direct mandates (constituency seats)
Taiwan	5%	Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP)	3 (as of 2024)	Similar to Germany's "back-door routes": win at least three direct mandates (constituency seats)

Source: Compile from many sources by the author, based on the last parliamentary election

Germany and Taiwan have a higher threshold than Indonesia by one per cent while also balancing representation through "back-door routes." On the other hand, Indonesia's lower threshold allows smaller parties some chance of representation but lacks back-door routes, which likely reduces overall representation.

Indonesia could consider adopting the German or Taiwanese model by implementing "back-door routes" rules and increasing the threshold through electoral reform, shifting from pure proportional representation to mixed-member proportional representation. This reform could also address the issue of wasted votes, which leads to disproportionality. The purpose of back-door routes is to ensure that parties with significant support in specific areas (enough to

win direct seats) can still gain proportional representation, even if they do not meet the overall vote percentage threshold. This approach would help smaller or regionally concentrated parties gain representation.

CONCLUSION

The interplay between a presidential system and a multiparty structure can theoretically lead to governmental instability, as the involvement of numerous parties in power can lead to legislative gridlock and inefficiency. To address these issues, simplifying the number of political parties through mechanisms of parliamentary thresholds is proposed. Based on Mainwaring's framework, the paper argues that Indonesia should maintain the current 4% threshold or even raise it for the upcoming 2029 elections. Lowering the threshold, as suggested by Perludem in their proposal to Indonesia's Constitutional Court, is not recommended, according to the paper's findings. Lowering the threshold will lead to greater party fragmentation and less effective government. Raising the threshold should improve the quality of political parties and strengthen the presidential political system. In addition, the factional structure in the DPR should also be simplified into only two or three factions: the government supporters, the opposition, and the independent as to be the third faction.

The research compares Indonesia's multiparty system with Germany's and Taiwan's, all of which use a 5 per cent threshold and mixed-member proportional representation systems. It highlights potential electoral reforms for Indonesia. Indonesia's adoption of similar reforms could mitigate the issue of wasted votes, improve proportional representation, and create a more stable government. Further in-depth analysis and additional data are still needed for the strengthening of these preliminary research findings and the discussion of future research.

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